

# Beyond conflict in Clayoquot Sound: the future of sustainable forestry\*

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## SUMMARY

Parai and Esakin describe how the multiple stakeholders concerned with the forest resources around Clayoquot Sound, Canada, moved from conflict to collaboration in land-use planning. State-sanctioned plans for timber harvesting by a multinational corporation provoked protests from indigenous peoples, local residents and environmentalists, who challenged this policy through coalition building and other strategies. As the power imbalance declined among the disputants, the government and the corporation were drawn into collaborative arrangements with the other stakeholders.

\*This case study builds upon an earlier study drafted by Brian Parai and Matt Price (Stern and Hicks, 2000). The authors would like to thank all of those whose input and contributions made it possible, including: Tony Bennett, W.D. "Whitey" Bernard, Adrian Carr, Linda Coady, Valerie Langer, Jack Little, Don McMillan, Craig Paskin, Matt Price and Alissa Stern.

## GUIDING QUESTIONS

### KEY ISSUES

- How did the stakeholders shift from conflict to participation in natural resource management?
- What can governments do to facilitate an enabling environment for conflict resolution?
- Ideally, how long should it take to resolve or manage conflicts?

### CONTEXT

- Who were the primary stakeholders?
- What role did the market play in the conflict and in conflict management processes?

### CONFLICT BACKGROUND OR HISTORY

- Why were the conflicting parties initially unwilling to compromise?
- Why did the conflict develop into a volatile situation?

### CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION PROCESSES

- How were the various interested parties brought together?
- How did “power balancing” come about?
- Did coalition building help or hinder conflict resolution?

### CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OUTCOMES

- Are all the issues in the conflict resolved completely?
- Do you think that the agreements are sustainable?

### LESSONS LEARNED

- Is the approach to conflict management in Clayoquot Sound applicable to conflict situations that you are familiar with? Why or why not?

## KEY ISSUES

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This case shows how ensuring the active, balanced and cooperative participation of multiple stakeholders in land-use planning and resource management decision-making processes can help to resolve environmental conflicts. In Clayoquot Sound, Canada, the setting for the multiparty conflict explored here, the community of stakeholders – from local residents and Nuu-chah-nulth Central Region First Nations (indigenous) peoples<sup>1</sup> to logging corporations, governments and environmental organizations – experimented with numerous public consultation processes. These had varying degrees of success over the course of a conflict that lasted for nearly 20 years. Despite ongoing efforts to maximize stakeholder participation, the parties were continuously challenged to work together to design and implement solution-oriented plans in a context within which stakeholder powers were seriously imbalanced, as they remained until the final few years of the conflict. As this case demonstrates, once such imbalances had been remedied, the various disputants voluntarily entered into coalition building activities that subsequently led to a constructive resolution of the conflict (for a historical overview see Box).

The various consultative and participatory processes used during the first 15 years of this dispute enabled the principal stakeholders to communicate their interests. But it was not until a formal change in the land-use and resource management decision-making process in Clayoquot Sound took place that power began to be shared more equitably and the negotiating table became more balanced. Through the creation of an institutional mechanism that guaranteed previously disempowered stakeholders a role in a resource-based decision-making process, these same stakeholders and their allies came to be able to spend more of their energy developing solutions to the conflict rather than searching for ways to disrupt their opponents. Before long, the power had balanced to a point where even the least represented parties had managed to protect themselves from their worst-case scenarios. Thereafter, conflict management processes transformed into conflict resolution processes, and the stakeholders began to seek reasonable compromise solutions that satisfied all principal interests.



1. The use of the term “Nuu-chah-nulth” in this document relates solely to the Central Region Bands of the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations of Vancouver Island as Clayoquot Sound is not located within the traditional territory of either the North or the South Region Bands of the Nuu-chah-nulth.

<b>BOX HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT</b>	
<b>Year</b>	<b>Event</b>
1979	Conflict begins over proposed logging on Meares Island in Clayoquot Sound
1985	British Columbia (BC) Supreme Court grants Nuu-chah-nulth an injunction prohibiting logging on Meares until outstanding land claims are resolved
1993	BC Government announces its Clayoquot Land Use Decision authorizing two-thirds of the area's forest to be logged Conflict reaches its peak with mass blockades and arrests in Clayoquot Sound Media coverage of conflict increases and environmentalists join together to dissuade international buyers from purchasing MacMillan-Bloedel (MB) products BC Government establishes Scientific Panel for Clayoquot Sound Nuu-chah-nulth appeal to BC Ombudsman who recommends that provincial government redo Land Use Decision with greater First Nations involvement in decision-making process
1994	Nuu-chah-nulth and provincial government sign Interim Measures Agreement (IMA), creating Central Region Board (CRB) to oversee all resource-use and management decisions in Clayoquot Sound
1995	Scientific Panel calls for ecosystem-based approach to logging in Clayoquot Sound, and BC Government accepts all of its recommendations
1997	With the environmental coalition's international marketing campaign against MB continuing and the important Japanese timber market bottoming out, the company permanently closes its operations in Clayoquot Sound
1998	MB and Nuu-chah-nulth establish Iisaak, a joint-venture sustainably focused old-growth logging company that receives active support from environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS)
2000	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designates Clayoquot Sound a World Biosphere Reserve

As a result of the productive transformation of this conflict, unique models for public land and resource management, and also for old-growth logging and marketing, have been established. The process through which the conflict went from being intractable to becoming constructive merits consideration by parties seeking to find rewarding ways around seemingly impassable blockages. Likewise, dispute resolution professionals and those who focus more specifically on facilitating public relations or environmental sustainability may benefit from learning more about the methods of enhancing stakeholder participation, power balancing and coalition building presented in this case study.

## CONTEXT

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The future status of the forest of Clayoquot Sound – whether or not it would be logged and, if so, how much and in what manner – was the principal issue and point of contention dividing the stakeholders involved in this conflict. While the stakeholders were from many parts of civil society and government (see Table), only a representative assortment of these played principal roles in the management and resolution of the conflict.

Clayoquot Sound is characterized by an old-growth coastal temperate rain forest encompassing an area of nearly 300 000 ha and trees of up to 1 200 years of age. The region has been inhabited for millennia by the peoples of the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations and, since the late 1800s, by immigrants from Europe, Asia, Eastern Canada and elsewhere. Located on the west coast of Vancouver Island, the area is inhabited by seven principal communities, with a total of 5 000 permanent residents: five Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations communities (the Ahousaht, Hesquiaht, Tla-o-qui-aht, Toquaht and Ucluelet) totalling 2 500 people and two non-First Nations communities (Tofino and Ucluelet) totalling 2 500 people. Traditionally, fishing (primarily the salmon fishery and whaling) and gathering activities provided the main sources of food for the Nuu-chah-nulth people. Today, aquaculture, tourism and, to a much lesser degree, forestry drive the local economy.

A number of political factors have affected the conflict. One such factor stems from the British Columbia (BC) Government's intimate relationship with the timber industry. When the conflict began over planned logging on Meares Island in 1979, the forest industry in BC was largely self-regulating. As the province has always been highly dependent on its timber revenues, this arrangement has served both the government, which collects stumpage fees from logging activi-

TABLE	LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS
Group	Members
Local residents	Local inhabitants and property owners
Logging companies	Weyerhaeuser (formerly MacMillan-Bloedel Ltd) Interfor (International Forest Products Ltd) Iisaak (a joint-venture logging company owned by MAMOOK, a Nuu-chah-nulth corporation, and Weyerhaeuser)
Local, national and international ENGOS	Including the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, Western Canada Wilderness Committee, Sierra Club of Western Canada, Greenpeace Canada and the Natural Resources Defense Council
The peoples of the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations	The Ahousaht First Nation The Hesquiaht First Nation The Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation The Toquaht First Nation The Ucluelet First Nation
The Government of the Province of British Columbia	The Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks; the Ministry of Forests; the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs; the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel on Sustainable Forestry Practices
Local governmental bodies	The Regional District of Alberni-Clayoquot; the District Municipalities of both Tofino and Ucluelet; the Clayoquot Sound CRB
Organized labour	Forest workers represented by the International Woodworkers' Association
The Government of Canada	Departments of: Heritage, responsible for National Parks; Environment; Fisheries and Oceans; Indian and Northern Affairs
The ecotourism industry	Ecotourists and service companies ranging from nature expeditions and guided tours to beachcombing, surfing and sea kayaking
UNESCO	UNESCO's Clayoquot Sound World Biosphere Reserve, established in 2000, is locally represented by the Clayoquot Biosphere Trust (CBT)

ties, and companies, which are awarded logging permits.<sup>2</sup> Another factor that had an important influence on the conflict was the increase in environmental awareness – both locally and globally – that accompanied the growth of the conflict over the course of the 1980s and 1990s.

In BC, as in much of the rest of Canada, this growing environmental consciousness occurred at a time in which people were increasingly exerting their right to a greater say in public matters. In Canada, a liberal democracy where citizens traditionally defer to political elites in decision-making processes, the growth in civil society activism also corresponded with the 1982 constitutional entrenchment of the country's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, when the conflict in Clayoquot Sound was developing in the early 1980s, the federal and provincial governments in Canada were just beginning to adjust to the Canadians' call for increasingly direct involvement in public policy decision-making.

Major drops in international timber and pulp markets in 1997 also influenced the context within which the conflict took place in Clayoquot Sound. The fall in the international markets coincided with both an international campaign to boycott the products of MacMillan-Bloedel (MB), at the time the largest timber harvester in the Sound, and the company's decision to discontinue logging the old-growth forest of the politically, environmentally and socially sensitive area.

## **CONFLICT BACKGROUND OR HISTORY**

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The conflict in Clayoquot Sound began in 1979 when area residents learned of provincial plans to allow Meares Island to be logged (clear-cut).<sup>3</sup> This announcement raised concerns among the Nuu-chah-nulth and the non-aboriginal residents of Tofino. The primary concerns of Tofino's residents were ensuring the integrity of the village's Meares-based water supply and maintaining the local viewscape. Since Meares is part of Nuu-chah-nulth traditional territory and home to the more than 1 000-year-old Tla-o-qui-aht village of Opitsaht, local First Nations were also opposed to the logging.

The following year, as local residents became more active on the issue, a round-table consultation process – the Meares Island Planning Team – was formed by

2. Evidence of the BC Government's close relationship with the forest industry is provided by Magnusson and Shaw (1997), which indicates that in 1995 the provincial government purchased shares in MacMillan-Bloedel, making it "the largest known shareholder in the company". For more on the BC Government's relationship with the forest industry see Drushka (1999).

3. While the modern form of this conflict began taking shape in the late 1970s and early 1980s, from the perspective of the First Nations peoples the conflict began more than a century earlier when their land was taken over by Euro-Canadians and they ceased to be independent.

the provincial government to enable citizens, the government, local logging companies and other stakeholders to meet to discuss the future of the island's forests. The planning team was facilitated by the province and offered stakeholders interested in the issue a chance to have their voice heard. In 1983, after three years of discourse, MB discontinued its involvement in the planning process in opposition to the revenue implications of the principal proposal being considered by the team: that only limited logging be allowed on parts of the island for the following 25 years. MB was not the only participant to reject this proposal. Hard-line environmentalists seeking to block all logging on the island were also unwilling to support such a compromise solution.

In 1984, upon termination of the consultative process, the BC Government announced that 90 percent of Meares Island would be logged – an option that had not been favoured by the planning team. The first anti-logging blockades in Canadian history occurred in response. Facing a climate of confrontation and uncertainty, MB chose not to move ahead immediately with its Meares operation, despite its legal permit to do so. Subsequently, in 1985, the issue over logging on Meares was made indefinitely undecided when a Nuu-chah-nulth legal application filed earlier that year resulted in the imposition of an injunction legally to prohibit MB from logging on Meares until the First Nations' land claim had been resolved. The rationale for the injunction granted by the BC Supreme Court was that if the logging was allowed to go ahead before the conclusion of the treaty process, the First Nations would lose much of the cultural and economic value of the land for generations to come, even if they were to win legal title to it. There was no appeal against the injunction, which remains in place to this day.

With the forests of Meares representing only a portion of the old-growth forests in Clayoquot Sound, the injunction merely prompted logging tenure holders to focus their attention on cutting timber elsewhere in the region. The focus of environmental opposition also shifted from being rooted in local residents' concerns for their water supplies and viewsapes to a more international focus on protecting some of the planet's last remaining tracts of old-growth coastal temperate rain forest. Likewise, the Nuu-chah-nulth took further issue with additional logging that had been planned by MB and permitted by the BC Government within other traditional Nuu-chah-nulth territories affected by unsettled land claims.





## **CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION PROCESSES**

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In the years that followed the conflict on Meares, environmental challenges came to confront all logging activities in Clayoquot Sound. These challenges arose in a dynamic context that was being continuously shaped and reshaped by the key stakeholders and, to some extent, by the international market for forest products. As the conflict played out and new situations and dynamics arose, the stakeholders responded by following or developing methods that would best serve their interests. Three of the principal methods or techniques used by the parties between the mid-1980s and 2000 deserve closer attention: enhancing stakeholder participation, power balancing and coalition building.

### **Enhancing stakeholder participation**

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Between 1985 and 1993, a number of consensus-based public consultation processes were initiated. Following the example of the previously unsuccessful Meares Island Planning Team, none of these subsequent multiparty planning processes was ever able to satisfy all of the participating stakeholders and, therefore, none of them ever reached the necessary level of consensus. Although the immediate effects of these processes may be difficult to pinpoint, the debate and engagement they fostered probably helped lay the foundation for the eventually cooperative outcome of the conflict.

The first significant participatory consultation process established after 1983 was the Tofino Steering Committee on Sustainable Development. The committee was established in 1988 by local residents in order to begin to articulate a community vision for logging in the region. Tofino residents were strongly supportive of the process and their level of participation in its work was high. The following year the BC Government expressed its willingness to provide financial support to the committee. However, the province felt that the existing process was not sufficiently representative of the interested stakeholders, and thus decided to replace the committee with the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (CSSDTF).

The task force, which was initiated in 1990, was terminated in 1991 after reaching an impasse over short-term conservation issues and because of continued logging. During its period of operation, CSSDTF attempted to determine how much and where logging should take place in Clayoquot Sound. Participants found the far-reaching goals of this process to be overwhelming and the industry and environmental stakeholders proved unable to reach a consensus. The task force con-

cluded its work by recommending that a new process with a more restricted mandate be created. Accordingly, later in 1991, the province responded by establishing the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee (CSSDSSC).

While the BC Government gave CSSDSSC the task of working out future plans for logging in the area, the provincial Cabinet assumed responsibility for short-term forestry planning in Clayoquot Sound, in an attempt to reduce the ongoing forestry controversy by undertaking top-level decision-making and responsibility for the matter. Shortly thereafter, and despite the new steering committee's preference for across-the-board conservation during its planning phase, the provincial Cabinet announced a decision that strongly favoured short-term logging activities, to the benefit of both industry and provincial forest revenues. This decision evoked strong criticism from conservationists and prompted all environmental representatives and one tourism representative to walk away from the consensus-based CSSDSSC process.

CSSDSSC was still struggling to reunite the parties in 1992 when the recently elected, relatively socialist New Democrat Party Government decided to tackle a growing number of provincial environmental challenges by initiating a province-wide public consultation process. Because of the existing CSSDSSC process, Clayoquot Sound was the only area in BC that was excluded from the new process. Established in 1992, the British Columbia Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) was mandated to conduct broad-based and extensive public consultations on land-use and resource management policy issues across the rest of the province. The following year the CSSDSSC process collapsed, having been as unable to achieve consensus as its predecessors.


### **Power balancing**

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Despite the BC Government's efforts to enhance public involvement and establish an environment conducive to initiating solution-oriented stakeholder discussions, all of the failed participatory processes had been created with unrealistic objectives. First, at a stage of the conflict when some of the parties were categorically opposed to the positions of their opponents, the chances of arriving at a consensus-based decision were at best limited. Second, as the forest industry (with its government-issued logging permits) and the provincial government (with its legislative authority) could both satisfy their interests in logging without the consent of the consultation processes, the rest of the parties entered into these processes at a critical disadvantage. Thus, the First Nations and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS), in particular, spent much of the earlier stages of the conflict seeking to gain power and to level the playing field.

The most significant period of power balancing took place in the months leading up to and following the peak of the conflict in July 1993, which was reached immediately after the BC Government announced the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. The recommendation of the province – that one-third of the Sound’s old-growth forests be protected and the remaining two-thirds be logged – met with great opposition, despite the fact that the decision had been intended to represent a compromise between industry and environmental interests. The Land Use Decision marked a turning point in the conflict, both in terms of power distribution and in terms of the methods being used by the stakeholders to deal with the conflict. Feeling that the government’s latest decision catered overwhelmingly to the forest industry and ignored many of the arguments put forward throughout the preceding six years of consultations, the First Nations and ENGOs began to seek new ways to influence both the province and MB. In so doing, these two stakeholders found a way to influence the outcome of the conflict and to be recognized as indispensable components of any eventual resolution.

The ENGOs responded to the Land Use Decision first by organizing road blockades in an attempt physically to prevent the logging. In a massive display of civil disobedience, more than 10 000 people from around the world converged on Clayoquot Sound in the summer of 1993 to demonstrate their opposition to the planned clear-cut logging. Capitalizing upon the international public exposure brought by the protesters and their blockades to the conflict, active ENGOs gained additional support from Greenpeace (Europe) and the Rainforest Action Network (the United States). Before long, the ENGOs had established an international marketing campaign aimed at shutting down MB’s Clayoquot Sound operations by persuading international buyers of MB products to boycott the company because of its environmentally insensitive logging of the old-growth rain forests of Clayoquot Sound. Threatened with both the possibility of being branded with a negative corporate image and the potential of losing customers, as well as (after 1995) being affected by a falling Japanese timber market, MB’s power dominance in the conflict began to diminish.



At the same time as ENGOs were working on pressuring MB to reconsider its logging plans, the Nuu-chah-nulth were striving to affect a similar response from the BC Government. As the area's traditional occupants, the First Nations were not categorically opposed to logging in Clayoquot Sound. They did, however, seek to establish a more environmentally sustainable approach to logging in the area, over which they would have greater control of planning and logging activities, as well as of the profits thereof. A key move made by the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations in the period following the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was to file a complaint with the Ombudsman of British Columbia on the grounds that the BC Government had overlooked their interests in making the decision. The Ombudsman reviewed the complaint and quickly agreed with the Nuu-chah-nulth peoples that their traditional territory within Clayoquot Sound was put at risk as a result of the Land Use Decision. Given their historical connection to the land and the developing treaty negotiations, the Ombudsman reported that the First Nations had had a right to be consulted prior to the Land Use Decision and recommended that the decision be reformulated accordingly.

By late 1993, although the BC Government was not legally required to implement the Ombudsman's recommendations, it began negotiations with the Nuu-chah-nulth over a new role for the First Nations in future (pre-treaty) land-use planning and resource management initiatives. In March 1994, the negotiations concluded with the signing of an Interim Measures Agreement (IMA) that created a Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board (CRB), thereby establishing a system of First Nations and provincial co-management of the area. CRB is composed of an equal number of BC Government and First Nations representatives, but First Nations have the right to final approval of all board decisions. The BC Government retains the right to approve all activity performed on Crown (public) land in the region. But the IMA (and its renewals in 1996 and 2000) authorizes CRB to review all of the province's land-use and resource management decisions on Crown land in Clayoquot Sound prior to their implementation. Through the creation of CRB, which has also helped facilitate community dialogue over land and resource planning in Clayoquot Sound, the First Nations were guaranteed the power to participate in all future Crown land-use decisions in the area.

Further affecting the highly dynamic context within which the conflict was being managed, and the ability of the logging industry to be largely self-regulating, were the 1994-1995 recommendations of the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound. Established by the province in 1993 (at the extra-jurisdictional recommendation of the Commission on Resources and the Environment), the Scientific Panel was charged with mapping out sustainable forest management and practices in the Sound by combining traditional and scientific knowledge. The BC Government accepted the panel's more than 170 rec-

ommendations in 1995, agreeing that an ecosystem-based approach would apply to all future land and resource planning and management decisions in Clayoquot Sound and that the CRB would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the panel's recommendations.

A final turning point in the conflict, which provoked a fundamental change in the balance of power between the stakeholders, occurred in 1996. MB was influenced to varying degrees by the Scientific Panel recommendations, the years of environmental protests and the ENGOS' international campaign to have the company's products boycotted, as well as the First Nations' negotiations with the provincial government and the major fall in the international pulp and timber markets. In 1996, the company announced a one-year closure of its Clayoquot Sound operations. The following year, in 1997, it closed down its operations in Clayoquot Sound permanently. While many environmentalists from around the world considered the closure a victory at the end of a long, hard-fought battle, laid-off local loggers and their families faced the beginning of a difficult period of economic and social readjustment.

### **Coalition building**

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Four years before MB shut down its Clayoquot Sound operations permanently, the original steps towards a productive solution to this conflict were taken. In the immediate aftermath of the BC Government's 1993 Land Use Decision, which immediately preceded the climax of the conflict, the Nuu-chah-nulth initiated a series of meetings with ENGO stakeholders. This move facilitated the coordination of efforts between the ENGOS and the First Nations at a time when both sides were working independently to ensure that Clayoquot Sound's forest would not be clear-cut. This early coalition building effort eventually came to serve as the basis for a new model of cooperation between all the parties.



The most pronounced coalition building phase began tentatively once the balance of power had begun to shift in favour of the First Nations and the ENGOS. In July 1996, with the aim of persuading the ENGOS to end their international campaign against the company, MB expressed an interest in meeting its environmental opponents. Not long after, the ENGOS' liaison person to the Nuu-chah-nulth approached and met MB's Vice President for Environmental Affairs. MB wanted to see the ENGOS' international campaign against the company stopped and the ENGOS wanted to see Clayoquot Sound's forests protected. Accordingly, the two sides were able to agree that establishing a common vision between the company and the ENGOS might well represent the best chance for a future resolution of the conflict. Thus, the possibility of working together to help create a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) biosphere reserve in the region was discussed and subsequently presented to the Central Region Chiefs, who agreed to support the initiative.

Further discussions were pursued, and by 1997 MB, the ENGOS and the First Nations had reached some degree of consensus on the development of a biosphere reserve. However, to fulfil a clause in the 1996 Interim Measures Extension Agreement between the BC Government and the First Nations, an additional component to the plan was proposed. This addition entailed establishing a First Nations-MB joint-venture logging company. With all the key stakeholders on side for the biosphere reserve, a local facilitator was contracted, with money provided by the provincial and federal governments, to lead the community in putting together an application for a UNESCO World Biosphere Reserve. At the same time, the Nuu-chah-nulth and MB began carefully negotiating the establishment of Iisaak Forest Resources, an environmentally sensitive, joint-venture, old-growth logging company. The biosphere reserve and the joint-venture company that were subsequently established represent the final outcome of this 20-year-long multiparty conflict.



## CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OUTCOMES

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While much has been achieved by all of the stakeholders throughout the course of the conflict in Clayoquot Sound, the First Nations–MB joint-venture company, Iisaak, and the Clayoquot Sound UNESCO World Biosphere Reserve, designated in 2000, represent the two most significant outcomes.

### Iisaak

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The well-supported development of Iisaak after all the controversy over logging in Clayoquot Sound probably owes part of its existence to the fact that the First Nations peoples and other local residents (who fill the province's seats on CRB) had been granted an institutionalized high-level opportunity to participate in public policy decision-making in the region through CRB. In addition, the creation of this new company seemed to be facilitated by the improvements that were occurring in the once extremely adversarial relationship between MB and the ENGOs at the time that the joint venture was proposed.

Iisaak was created as a First Nations–MB (now Weyerhaeuser) logging corporation. The company, which is not yet well known by local First Nations residents, was founded to maximize the economic and social benefits of the forest in a manner consistent with two Nuu-chah-nulth principles: "Iisaak", which means respect and humility; and "Hishuk-ish ts'awalk", which means recognition of the interconnectedness of all things.

The debate over logging in Clayoquot Sound had long been a highly charged issue pursued by disputants with strongly entrenched positions. However, within one year of MB's shutting down of its operations in the region, major environmental opponents of MB were offering their support to the new joint-venture company. In return for Iisaak's commitment not to log pristine valleys, the Western Canada Wilderness Committee, the Sierra Club of Western Canada, Greenpeace Canada and the Natural Resources Defense Council all signed (and have since renewed) a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), in which they not only agree to support Iisaak tacitly, but also to help market the high-value specialty timber logged by the company. To date, the only active ENGO that has chosen not to sign the MOU is Friends of Clayoquot Sound, which has elected, for the time being, neither to oppose nor to support Iisaak.

While efforts are continuing to develop a suitable international market for rare 400 to 1 000-year-old timber, Iisaak is working on developing cost-effective ways to log the non-pristine areas of its Clayoquot Sound permit in accordance with the stringent local industry standards established by the Scientific Panel. In 2000, a new


joint-venture logging company was established by Interfor, the other (and minor) forest tenure holder in Clayoquot Sound. This partnership was founded by Interfor, local First Nations and the community of Ucluelet, and is in competition with Iisaak. Bound environmentally by the same strict standards, the ability of both these companies to maintain community support may ultimately depend upon their ability to establish themselves as durable economic forces in the community.

### **UNESCO World Biosphere Reserve**

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In 2000, the same year that Iisaak began its logging operations, Clayoquot Sound was designated as a biosphere reserve under the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere programme. The establishment of the Clayoquot Sound UNESCO World Biosphere Reserve was made possible by more than a decade of related local public consultation and community building activities. At the ground level, the reserve was created to help foster constructive dialogue between stakeholders, including residents, locally elected councils, local First Nations band councils, ENGOs, industry and the provincial and federal governments.

The same year, a community-based, not-for-profit organization – the Clayoquot Biosphere Trust (CBT) – was established as the administrative cornerstone of the biosphere reserve. Authorized to manage a Can\$12 million endowment fund granted by the Government of Canada, CBT is mandated to promote and support environmentally focused research, education and training initiatives. Consequently, CBT's work will encourage activities related both to the development of healthy and sustainable communities in the biosphere reserve region and to the provision of support for the reserve's "twin pillars" of conservation and sustainable development. Observers, stakeholders and neutral process facilitators alike have agreed that the establishment of the biosphere reserve has helped entrench direct community involvement in creating a shared vision for the social and ecological integrity of Clayoquot Sound. If the reserve had not been established, current and future logging efforts in the area, including those of Iisaak, would probably face strong opposition.





## LESSONS LEARNED

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Specific lessons were learned about each of the principal methods employed throughout the management and resolution phases of the conflict.

### Enhancing stakeholder participation

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This case teaches how important it can be for a government not only to create an enabling environment in which stakeholders can convene to discuss public policy decisions before they are made, but to incorporate the advice such consultations offer in subsequent policy pronouncements. If sufficiently inclusive, appropriately mandated and linked to responsible decision-making processes, public consultation processes can help to gain the support and partnership of those stakeholders who have the potential to produce the best policy decisions possible and to enhance their chances for successful implementation.

In Clayoquot Sound, the BC Government initiated a number of public consultation processes to determine better the views of its constituents and of the various stakeholder groups with whom they affiliated after it became obvious that its policies were facing significant opposition. However, despite the fact that broad-based public consultations can foster the development of more effective and appropriate policy responses, there appears to have been one key weakness in the processes that took place in Clayoquot Sound between 1980 and 1993. This limitation was manifested in the government demonstration – particularly through the logging-related decisions it made in both 1983 (allowing 90 percent of Meares Island to be clear-cut) and 1993 (authorizing two-thirds of Clayoquot Sound to be logged) – that it did not feel obliged to respond to major issues considered by the consultation processes it had initiated.

Such policy decisions, taken on highly controversial matters without due consideration of the public interest – particularly when it has been actively solicited – can lead to opposition and demonstrations that can disrupt or even prevent policy implementation. In Clayoquot Sound, it took the establishment of a high-level review board (CRB), which institutionalized the participation of one key stakeholder (the First Nations), before previously disempowered stakeholders could begin to trust that the value of their participation was recognized and that their views would be both heard and listened to.

### Power balancing

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When the original public consultation process established in 1980 to deal with the Meares Island controversy folded, the province responded by making a decision that ignored the more moderate compromise proposals that the consultation

process had been discussing. This highlighted the power imbalance that existed between the government and the logging industry on the one hand and the local residents, environmental organizations and the First Nations on the other. The ENGOs and the First Nations made an application for a court injunction, appealed for Ombudsman support, and road blockades and protests followed, together with an international market-based boycotting campaign. These events show that disempowered groups that are committed to participating in a meaningful way in a decision-making process may focus their efforts on obstructing their opponents until the power imbalance is remedied. A key lesson that disputants in conflicts with similar power issues can learn from this case is that early efforts to engage and empower relatively weak stakeholders can facilitate the building of relations that may serve to prevent destructive confrontations and to bring about, instead, cooperative and solution-oriented efforts.

### **Coalition building**

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In this case, once all the key stakeholders were represented at the negotiating table and had an equitable amount of power, the disputing parties were able to begin dealing with each other, although uncertainly at first, as partners rather than opponents. As the disputants began to realize that they all had shared interests, new options for progress began to open up. Examples of these shared interests were: i) the environmentalists came to accept that local residents needed to work and that no logging at all was not a tenable option; and ii) MB came to realize that there was an advantage to working in harmony with the interests of local residents and environmentalists. In the increasingly cooperative climate that developed, the parties became more flexible in dealing with the conflict. Hard-set positions were no longer heavily guarded, allowing creative proposals to be put forward more freely than when the highly confrontational environment prevailed. Within this developing dynamic, all of the parties were better disposed to take responsibility for sharing the leadership of the conflict resolution process. Accordingly, when an opportunity for progress became evident, it was set out and advanced by whichever party was most disposed to do so at the time. In this way, all parties were able to provide to the overall process what was most needed from them.

Thereafter, parties began to work together voluntarily, and potential ways beyond the conflict came to be discussed. When it became clear that two of the most promising options had broad-based support, cooperative efforts were made to develop and implement them. What proved to be essential ingredients throughout this stage were the maintenance of clear lines of communication between the parties. For example, when MB and the ENGOs were working to develop ideas around what later came to be the biosphere reserve, they con-

stantly checked back with the First Nations. These open lines of communication facilitated a set of informal checks and balances that kept the ongoing activities within the acceptable limits of all parties and enhanced the growth of the developing coalition.

## CONCLUSION

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Above all, this case teaches the importance of ensuring active and balanced stakeholder participation and cooperation at all stages of public policy decision-making processes. The community of involved stakeholders – from local residents and indigenous peoples to logging corporations and environmental organizations – learned that by working together to design and implement solution-oriented plans, each stakeholder could avoid undesirable outcomes while making constructive progress towards a sustainable resolution. In this manner, the stakeholders to the conflict in Clayoquot Sound succeeded in transforming their situation from an intractable and volatile battle at its worst to an internationally unique example of environmental, community and corporate partnership at its end.

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